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How Does Democracy Reduce Poverty?

A study of dispersed power within ten African countries

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A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of the
degree of Master of Arts in Democratic Governance

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COMPULSORY DECLARATION

This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.

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MA in Democratic Governance
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Abstract

This paper makes the case that democracy can reduce poverty. The exigency for such a discourse derives from the discrepancy of the causal direction of the relationship between democracy and development. Building on theoretical underpinnings introduced by Amartya Sen and the empirical demonstration by Morton Halperin *et al.* in *The Democracy Advantage*, this paper argues that the dispersed power within democracy contributes to the satisfaction of citizens' basic physiological needs. This conjecture is systematically and empirically tested over a six-year period using ten developing countries in Africa.

The data reveals that higher levels of democracy correspond to subsequent increases in basic needs satisfaction—reductions in poverty—especially at low levels of wealth. These findings confirm Halperin *et al.*'s assertion that democracy holds an advantage over authoritarianism by improving social welfare in developing countries. Furthermore, the results of this study detail how dispersing power within government and between government and society allows for development through innovation, experimentation and incremental change. These conclusions offer great promise for foreign aid distributors because they suggest democracy and economic development need not be viewed as competing priorities in developing countries. Democracy not only protects inalienable rights but also can help to satisfy basic needs.

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Chapter One: Introduction

I. Problem

In the latter half of the 20th century, American foreign policy promoted development as a predecessor to democracy. The United States supported dictators in hopes that economic growth would eventually bring conditions for sustainable liberal democratic development. The intellectual basis for these policies has been rooted in the theory of modernization, which touts development as a necessary precursor to democracy.

Seymour Lipset was the first to examine the correlation between democracy and development, claiming that well-to-do nations are more likely than poor countries to be democracies.¹ Adam Przeworski built a broad-based empirical case that more developed countries offer greater promise for democratic sustainability.² Ronald Inglehart outlined a human development sequence moving from basic economic development to value changes emphasizing self-determination and resulting in institutionalized democracy.³ For modernization theorists, development must precede democracy.

More recently, scholars have begun to reverse the causal arrow: that democracy contributes to development. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen argued for the intrinsic, protective and constructive importance of freedom for development.⁴ Empirical research, however, is varied on this question. Przeworski's work, covering the period from 1950 to 1990, contends there is no significant difference in total economic growth between democracies and autocracies.

When Morton Halperin *et al.* slightly redefined the concepts of democracy and development, they found that a higher level of democracy corresponded with higher levels of quality of life.⁵ Halperin *et al.* argued and demonstrated that higher quality democracies were more likely to improve quality of life for citizens.⁶ However they only *speculated* about the underlying causes, focusing on the concepts of shared power, openness and adaptability. I will attempt to investigate the positive correlation Halperin *et al.* found between the overall quality of democracy and the quality of life by unpacking democracy into a range of constituent dimensions in order to test Halperin *et al.*'s proposed causes. I will reframe democracy as dispersed power, arguing that this allows innovation, experimentation, and incremental change, which are at the core of Halperin's *et al.* theoretical argument. I will use measures of basic needs satisfaction (food, water and healthcare) to represent quality of life. And then I will empirically test the relationship between basic needs satisfaction and dispersed power by examining ten African countries⁷ from 1998 to 2004.

This statistical test is designed to answer my basic research question: Do higher levels of dispersed power within governments and between government and society improve subsequent basic needs satisfaction in Africa?

II. Significance of Study

Isolating the key causal mechanism between democracy and development has theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, this study could provide empirical evidence that dispersed power is responsible for the advantage democracy provides for development. On the other hand, the absence of a relationship would bring into question Halperin *et al.*'s speculations about the underlying causes behind a democracy advantage and leave us wondering precisely what it is about democracy that leads to development.

Practically, establishing a link between dispersed power and basic needs satisfaction would encourage aid distributors to support mechanisms that disperse power as a way to enhance both democracy and quality of life. Establishing a causal relationship would also cast doubt on the effectiveness of government strategies that aim to centralize power in an effort to better coordinate service delivery. Such an approach, for example, is evident in South Africa as the ruling party, the African National Congress, seeks to reduce the power of provinces in an effort to centralize delivery of services.

Furthermore, empirical evidence that dispersed power is advantageous for improving satisfaction of basic needs will raise serious concerns about 'grand strategies' proposed by policy makers and international financial institutions that claim to spur economic development and reduce poverty. Such results would reduce the credibility of universal development prescriptions, like the 'Washington Consensus.' Ultimately, this study would support the claim that incremental development strategies are preferable to centralized elite-plans implemented from 'above.'

Yet regardless of the results of this study, further research will be necessary to test the relationship between democracy and development using different measures of democracy in various settings over diverse periods of time.

III. State of Knowledge

The causal direction of the relationship between democracy and development remains unclear. Modernization theorists argue that development is required for democracy. Other scholars argue that democracy is advantageous for development. While theories exist to support both viewpoints, the increasing quality and quantity of available data enables scholars to empirically test their theories beyond foreign policy trial and error.

Seymour Lipset was the first to demonstrate a correlation between democracy and development. Lipset categorized countries as "more or less democratic," and considered whether a country had an uninterrupted political democracy since World War I and an absence of mass political movements in the last twenty-five years opposed to democracy.⁸ Lipset's indices of economic development included wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education. He conducted a cross-sectional analysis of countries in *European and English Speaking Nations* and *Latin American Nations* using data available from various years during the 1950s. Although Lipset concluded that economic development increases the chances for sustainable democracy, one could have also used his results to argue that democracy creates wealth.

In the 1960s modernization theory came to the forefront of American foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress, introduced by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, aimed to establish economic cooperation between North and South America with eventual goals of political freedom. One of the most prominent political economists behind the formation and implementation of this policy was Walt Rostow, who championed a 'take-off' model of economic growth.⁹ Throughout the rest of the 20th century, American foreign policy was predominantly driven by similar views that economic development facilitates political freedom and democracy.

Adam Przeworski and his colleagues established an empirical connection between democracy and development by analyzing all countries between 1950 and 1990. Przeworski categorized countries as either democracies or autocracies, defining a democracy as a country that has peacefully turned over ruling power at least once; his operational definition of development was GDP per capita. He determined that the timing of democratic transitions could not be predicted by a country's GDP per capita, but a country is almost guaranteed to *remain* democratic above a certain level of GDP per capita, approximately US\$4000.¹⁰ In short, his research finds that development is not an instigating factor for democracy, but contributes heavily to democratic sustainability. Finally, Przeworski determined there was no significant difference between *total* economic growth of dictatorships and democracies, although GDP per capita is higher in democracies due to higher population growth in autocracies.¹¹ Thus he finds no democracy advantage for development.

Ronald Inglehart has recently attempted to clarify, within modernization theory, the causal relationship between development and democracy. His *human development sequence* describes the process of broadening freedom, or *human choice*, in three steps, which he supports largely through survey data.¹² *Socioeconomic modernization* enables a departure from a mere survival mentality and increases the material, cognitive, and social capabilities for human choice. Then *cultural values* change to support self-determination. *Democracy* provides best the institutional framework to protect and maximize this growing capacity and priority for freedom of action. Thus Inglehart also argues that some degree of development must precede democracy.

At the turn of the century, however, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen turned modernization theory on its head by contending that the underlying freedom of choice within democracy is advantageous for development.¹³ He describes democracy's "intrinsic relevance" to development from values such as expression and association. Democracy also serves a "protective role" for development by preventing famines and other disasters through increased flows of information. Finally, democracy has a "constructive importance" to development because it enables effective, open discussions to formulate competent policy. In sum, democracy contributes to development.

In 2005 Morton Halperin *et al.* substantiated Sen's theory with empirical evidence. In *The Democracy Advantage*, Halperin *et al.* contend that higher quality democracies breed development, which they understand as higher quality of life, or social welfare for citizens.¹⁴ The book has created a stir among foreign policy makers in Washington, as it uses credible data to refute modernization theory. Halperin *et al.* reverse the causal arrow from democracy to development, arguing that democracy is superior to autocracy.

The use of new and updated data greatly facilitated Halperin *et al.*'s nuanced analysis. Contrary to Przeworski, Halperin *et al.* do not use a threshold operationalization to divide countries into democracies or autocracies. Instead, Halperin *et al.* use Polity ratings and freedom scores to create a continuum of democracy although their concept of democracy remains uni-dimensional, like Przeworski.¹⁵ Halperin *et al.*'s operational definition of development also goes beyond GDP to assess the ability of a country to meet people's basic needs, using social welfare indicators like life expectancy, school enrollment and death rates.¹⁶ At the time of the analysis data was available through 2003, enabling Halperin *et al.* to assess more than a decade of post-Cold War experience not considered in Przeworski's work.

Halperin *et al.*'s research demonstrates that "citizens of democracies live longer, healthier, and more productive lives, on average, than those in autocracies."¹⁷ More over, he finds that the higher the quality of a democracy, the greater the country's ability to improve quality of life by meeting citizens' basic needs.

Moving beyond their empirical data, however, Halperin *et al.* *speculate* about the dynamics that give rise to the empirical observations. They *reason* that shared power, openness and adaptability facilitate innovation, experimentation and incremental change. These traits enable democracies to improve quality of life better than autocracies, and more democratic countries better than less democratic countries. They then make some limited attempts to empirically test their proposed reasons, by comparing levels of accountability within democracies and autocracies, but do not thoroughly test these speculations.

In sum, a strong relationship is evident between democracy and development, but there is little consensus among scholars about the causality of the relationship or the dynamics that underlie the observed association. Thus building on Halperin *et al.*'s empirical work, I intend to test their reasoning about the causes of the democracy advantage.

Chapter Two: Research Design

I. Argument

My argument rests on assumptions about certain commonalities among all human beings. Underpinning the theoretical thrust of this argument is the assumption that all human beings desire freedom and self-determination. Only in a democratic society with guaranteed basic human rights can individuals realize their creative potential. Freedom allows individuals to promulgate their ideas, and dispersed power inhibits other individuals from taking credit for ideas that are not their own. Thus, a free and democratic society provides an environment conducive to advancing new ideas because individuals are rewarded for their creativity.

However, while human beings are resourceful and industrious, they are imperfect. Not all ideas are good ones. When an individual possesses unrestrained power, he or she can enact policies or ideas without consulting others. Whether the pursuit is well or ill intentioned, it can have equally poor results. Consequently, power must be dispersed to prevent a small minority from making quick, broad changes within a society. Thus democratic societies can experiment with different ideas, halting bad ones and pursuing the best ideas based solely on merit and experience.

Promoting the free-flow of ideas and preempting negative repercussions of bad ideas allows incremental change. Countries can develop policies and take actions that are best suited to their specific situations. Although all people prefer freedom and economic prosperity, the means to these ends are not universal. There are no 'one-size-fits-all' democratic promotion or economic development strategies. Dispersing power within government and between government and society allows new ideas, halts bad ones and eventually brings about incremental change.

II. Hypotheses


Using data on ten African countries between 1998 and 2004, I expect to find that:

1. Citizens of countries with higher levels of democracy in 1998 enjoyed greater improvements in development between 1998 and 2004 than those living in countries with lower levels of democracy.
2. Citizens of countries whose levels democracy increased between 1998 and 2004 experienced a greater improvement in development during the same period than those living in countries with less improvement (or even deterioration) during the same period.

III. Key Concepts

Development as Basic Needs Satisfaction

Development is multi-faceted and diversely understood. I use psychologist Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs as a guide to development. The first step on this pyramid of human needs includes physiological needs, like food and water (Figure 1).¹⁸



Although there are many subsequent components of human development, basic needs must be satisfied before any others. While phrased positively in this analysis as basic needs satisfaction (BNS), this development can also be referred to as poverty reduction.

Many indices attempt to measure poverty, but most do so indirectly. Traditional economic indicators measure antecedent causes, whether in resources, assets or capabilities. Other measures use consequences, such as longevity, health or happiness. The Afrobarometer, however, directly measures 'lived poverty' by asking respondents how often they have 'gone without' basic necessities.¹⁹

Economists may disapprove of this supposedly less objective strategy, but the Afrobarometer's technique has the advantage of being an absolute scale that inherently considers the context; it does not need to be contextualized to cost of living like income statistics. It systematically measures the "experiences, judgments and preferences of a representative sample of people."²⁰

The Afrobarometer survey asks respondents about food, water and healthcare. It is possible to aggregate these indicators as a composite index because "the more people experience shortages on any one indicator, the more likely they are to face shortages on the others."²¹ The survey also finds that people conceptualize shortages in the same way whether they experience poverty regularly or rarely.

Changes in the structure of the Afrobarometer scale merits additional attention. Between the first and second rounds of surveys, the scale was expanded from an ordinal scale of four to five

points. The only directly corresponding response category remained *never* 'gone without' food, water or healthcare.

However, I want to frame development in a positive rather than a negative way. Thus I convert the responses to the Afrobarometer survey questions into a measurement of basic needs satisfaction (BNS) by using the percentage of respondents who say they *never* went without food, water and healthcare in the previous twelve months. These components may theoretically comprise an index because they share commonalities as physiological needs that must be present to progress further on Maslow's hierarchy of needs.

Conceptualizing Democracy as Dispersed Power

The first step in any empirical study of democracy is to determine what will be considered a *democracy*. The literature on democratic theory is deep and wide, but some common requirements for democracy usually include "universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; more than one serious political party; and alternative sources of information."²² However, operationalizing this into a categorization of real countries is a recurring challenge.

Researchers may choose to analyze only countries that are nominally democratic, but I will make no such distinction.²³ Zachary Elkins shows that "looking for traces of democracy in seemingly 'nondemocratic' regimes makes good theoretical and methodological sense."²⁴ This inclusive approach allows observation of democratic tendencies in apparently autocratic countries and undemocratic tendencies in supposedly democratic countries.

To determine a democracy one must decide whether to use a threshold, a continuum or both. Przeworski uses a threshold, dividing countries into either democracies or autocracies. However, to account for variance among democracies and to reduce the chances of miscategorization, Halperin *et al.* assesses democracy on a gradation, or continuum. I will rate democracy on a continuum, referring to it as the *extent* of democracy.


When investigating a democracy, one must also decide whether to consider it in parts or as a whole. In contrast to analyses like Przeworski and Halperin *et al.* that consider entire polities, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino suggest measuring multiple components of democracy.²⁵ In order to observe nuances within a country's governance, I will use measures of multiple dimensions of democracy to assess the overall extent of democracy.

To pinpoint the underlying dynamics of democracy that contribute to innovation, experimentation and incremental change, I will expand Halperin *et al.*'s discussion of shared power to *dispersed power*. This concept encompasses a variety of power relationships that are not mutually exclusive, but broadly includes limited, separated and shared power. Theories of democracy that emphasize the importance of these ideas date back to James Madison and the Federalist Papers. Madison describes how the *limitation* of power helps "to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers [and] to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." *Separated* power enables "the usurpations [to be] guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate parts." *Shared* power connotes a society "broken

into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority."²⁶

However, because indications of limited, separated and shared power are closely related, it would not be worthwhile to use each category as a discrete concept to measure the extent of democracy. Instead I will use Diamond and Morlino's concepts of rule of law, civil and political freedoms, participation, competition and accountability to describe the multiple dimensions of dispersed power.²⁷

The following diagram (Figure 2) represents the conceptualization of dispersed power using Diamond and Morlino's dimensions of democracy. There is some interrelatedness between the dimensions of democracy; but this diagram represents the intersections of limited, separated and shared power. While each dimension may not always fit neatly into a either limited, separated or shared power, they all help to define dispersed power.



The rule of law can limit the amount of power any individual can exert, without repercussions, on another person or group. Equally distributing political and civil freedoms can help to share power amongst all parts of society, enabling each citizen to be involved in the democratic process. Widely based participation can share power amongst all citizens through elections; it can also limit the power of officials by using the vote to remove them from office. Competition can ensure that power is shared between groups, which are likely to contribute to a real separation of power within the government. Effective accountability can contribute to separated power between political institutions and it can also help voters limit the power of government. Admittedly, these distinctions are imprecise. Conceptually, they are loosely linked and it will be left to empirical analysis to determine if these dimensions should be considered within one overarching concept of dispersed power, or as separate dimensions.

Dimensions of Democracy: Definitions and Measures

a. Rule of Law

While the rule of law is a necessary foundation for democracy, it is difficult to define. David Beetham describes the rule of law as “the foundation of any civilized existence, let alone democratic government.”²⁸ Guillermo O’Donnell insists that law must be written, sanctioned following set procedures, publicly promulgated before regulated events, and fairly applied across equivalent cases.²⁹ In *Governance Matters IV* World Bank researchers describe rule of law broadly as the extent to which “agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.”³⁰ Thus beyond consistency and legitimacy, the intent and nature of the law are equally important to democracy.

Beyond this, a *democratic* rule of law emphasizes the role of fairness. The rule of law within democracies should provide “fair and predictable rules [that] form the basis for economic and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected.”³¹ The respect for universal human rights and dignity must be the base of fairness; a democratic society cannot create laws that discriminate or privilege the rights of certain citizens. A democratic rule of law should provide the guidelines and restrictions for a framework on which to build other democratic qualities.

I will use the World Bank’s measure of ‘Control of Corruption’ as the indicator of rule of law that is most likely to reflect dispersed power within a democratic society.³² This *Government Matters IV* indicator measures the “lack of respect...for the rules which govern.”³³ It serves as an indirect measure for the power balance within government. If there is less dispersed power, people can more easily engage in corrupt behavior. Shared and separated powers within a society enable people to prevent or hinder others’ attempts to usurp power and resources for personal gain. While control of corruption is not necessarily indicative of disperse power, the presence of corruption clearly indicates a *lack* of dispersed power.³⁴

b. Civil and Political Freedoms and Equality

Freedom is essential to democracy. Freedom and equality largely overlap with the literature on rule of law and are necessary prerequisites for other qualities of democracy. A constitution must guarantee rights and courts must protect them. Civil rights³⁵ are the main freedoms necessary to a democracy while political rights³⁶ are relevant to specific democratic processes. These “rights [necessarily] entail equality” as they are intended to apply universally among people living within a country.³⁷

In practice people do not necessarily enjoy the equality of political rights and civil liberties guaranteed by law. The procurement of civil and political equality is intertwined with socioeconomic equality. My argument considers political and civil rights as dimensions of democracy and thus components of the independent variable.³⁸

Although socioeconomic inequalities may compound political power and influence, civil and political rights along with freedom of the press can help to share power.³⁹ A freer press increases

the likelihood that the public is informed about government policies and actions. Greater civil and political freedoms enable people to take action. The extent to which the public realizes their freedoms and uses the information provided by free press will be considered in the next section. I will use Freedom House's freedom of press, civil liberties and political rights indicators to represent freedoms and equality.

c. Participation

A democracy must represent the interests of the people. In order for leaders to know the wishes of the people there must be public participation. Public participation is present in both civil and political processes. Entire studies are dedicated to examining public participation in civic society, which is extraordinarily important to building and nurturing democracy.⁴⁰ Civic participation is an indication of dispersed power within a society but is difficult to measure in national aggregated indices. It is interwoven throughout every aspect of society and varies in nature among countries.

Although political and civic participation are interrelated, I will primarily consider political participation. The ratio of voters who turnout to registered voters in a national election provides a snapshot of political participation.⁴¹ Elections enable each voter to share the power of deciding the political trajectory of the country. I will use the IFES Election Guide for turnout and registered voter data.⁴²

d. Competition

Without competition public participation is futile. Voter turnout could be one hundred percent, but if there is only one choice, it means nothing. There must be substantial competition among opposing ideas in order to ascribe credibility to the idea or representative supported by the public.

The link between competition and participation must move beyond elections. The *Polity IV* concept of 'Political Competition' attempts to measure "the extent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways." The researchers measure this concept "by the degree of institutionalization or 'regulation' of political participation, and by the extent of government restriction on political competition."⁴³ Thus, I will use the 'Political Competition' indicator to provide a detailed view of the ongoing regulations and restrictions that affect participation and competition.⁴⁴

e. Accountability

Effective democracy relies on mutual responsibilities. These democratic responsibilities, known as accountability, include making formal or informal agreements between parties to keep the other informed, giving explanations for decisions, and accepting or receiving predetermined sanctions for action or inaction.⁴⁵ Philippe Schmitter divides accountability into vertical and horizontal. The former applies to the relationship between citizens, representatives and rulers. The latter relates to the relationship between separate branches within the same government. Vertical accountability is closely related to the essence of democracy, and depends in large part

on shared power between government and society. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, generally does not directly involve the public but relies on limited and separated power within the government.

The previously discussed qualities of democracy are strongly related to accountability. An effective rule of law creates accountability within a society by ensuring rulers and citizens must be judged equally against a set of rules. Civil and political rights and equality create the beginnings of vertical accountability by protecting individuals and increasing flows of information to citizens. Competition and participation enable vertical accountability by creating an environment conducive to citizen action. These measures of dispersed power regarding action and information breed more accountable governance.

In order to measure vertical accountability, I use *Government Matters IV*'s 'Voice and Accountability' indicator, which aggregates multiple datasets to determine the amount of power shared between the public and the government.⁴⁶ This indicator intends to capture "the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced."⁴⁷

I use two *Polity IV* indicators, 'Executive Constraints' and 'Executive Recruitment,' to measure horizontal accountability within government.⁴⁸ 'Executive Constraints,' is operationally defined as the "extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities."⁴⁹ Once in office, this measure reflects the limits to executive power.

Such constraints are only effective if the possibility exists that the executive will be replaced. To fill this gap, *Polity IV* uses 'Executive Recruitment.' The concept combines "the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, the competitiveness of executive selection, and the openness of executive recruitment" to represent the "structural characteristics by which chief executives are recruited."⁵⁰ This measure alludes to the indirect limitations of executive power due to the increased possibility of replacement.

The measure of 'Voice and Accountability' provides insight into the vertical accountability between government and society. The *Polity IV* measures reflect horizontal accountability within the government. Although these measures are all accountability, their conceptual differences may result in dissimilar variation.

IV. A Summary of Variables and Indicators

To restate, the key variables and measures are:


Dependent Variable: Development

Basic Needs Satisfaction:

- Afrobarometer respondents that have *never* 'gone without' food, water and healthcare⁵¹

Independent Variable: Extent of Democracy (Framed as Disperse Power)

- a. *Rule of Law*:
 - *Governance Matters IV* 'Control of Corruption',⁵²
- b. *Civil and Political Freedoms and Equality*:
 - Freedom House 'Political Rights',⁵³
 - Freedom House 'Civil Liberties',⁵⁴
 - Freedom House 'Freedom of the Press',⁵⁵
- c. *Participation*:
 - IFES⁵⁶ ratios of voter turnout to registered voters⁵⁷
- d. *Competition*:
 - *Polity IV* 'Political Competition',⁵⁸
- e. *Accountability*:
 - *Governance Matters IV* 'Voice and Accountability',⁵⁹
 - *Polity IV* 'Executive Recruitment',⁶⁰
 - *Polity IV* 'Executive Constraints',⁶¹



The use of multiple databases, although diversifying the study, creates dissimilarities in times of measurement. Minimalizing differences in measurement times is of utmost importance to the integrity of the analysis. The Afrobarometer surveyed countries in three rounds with the first round in 1999 or 2000 and third round surveys in 2005. Variance across survey intervals presents irreconcilable inconsistencies that must be acknowledged. This accepted variance presents a choice of what year will be used as the initial measurement.


Governance IV measures of 'Control of Corruption' and 'Voice and Accountability' are available every two years, limiting the choice of initial measurements to 1998 or 2000. Because hypothesis (1) considers initial democracy measurements, it makes more sense to use 1998 as the

initial measure. Using measurements in 2000 would make initial democracy measures occur after some initial Afrobarometer surveys that provide data for the dependent variable of basic needs satisfaction. Furthermore, using 1998 as the initial time of measurement expands the time period in order to better assess longitudinal change. I chose 2004 as the final measurement for democracy because that was the most recent data available.

The validity of the participation indicators is limited by the different timing of elections in each country. Two elections occurred in every country between 1998 and 2006, with first elections between 1998 and 2001 and final elections between 2002 and 2006. Freedom House and *Polity IV* data provided yearly measurements, thus providing the greatest degree of flexibility. Across all variables the analysis uses measurements as near to 1998 and 2004 as possible in order to enhance reliability, transparency and systematic quality.

V. Expectations

I expect to find that greater dispersed power correlates with improvements in basic needs satisfaction, independent from the effects of 'third' variables. I expect that the components of dispersed power will relate because they intersect conceptually. The study may also show if any one dimension of dispersed power is more advantageous to improving basic needs satisfaction.



VI Methodology

The research design is cross-national and longitudinal, enabling the study to test for covariance, establish time order and conduct multivariable analysis to control for n^{th} variables. The two hypotheses will be considered separately, testing basic needs satisfaction as a function of dispersed power across ten countries: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The unit of analyses will be a country and its population. The level of analysis for the extent of democracy will be macro because it compares the condition of one country with another. The

original level of analysis for the quality of life is micro from the responses of individuals, but the data will be aggregated to represent the population of a given country. Consequently, the study intends to create generalizable results about the relationship between the overall extent of a country's democracy and the extent of lived poverty within a given country's population.

Creating Indices

Because there are various indicators for dispersed power, there may be correlations between the dependent variable and only some components of the independent variable. I will compare the correlations among different components of dispersed power and basic needs satisfaction, but I will also compare the components of dispersed power to determine if I can aggregate them into an index.

Controlling for Wealth

A strong correlation between dispersed power and improvements in basic needs satisfaction does not prove causation. So-called 'third' variables may be responsible for the relationship. I will consider the most common and probable competing explanation of wealth. I will control for Purchasing Power Parity GNI per capita⁶² to determine if the observed correlations exist independently of the wealth of a country.

Case Selection

The reliability and validity of the study are constrained by only using ten countries from 1998 to 2004. There may not be enough countries or data to eliminate the effect of outlying data points; or the sample may not be representative of Africa across time and space.

The limitations provided by the available data create a selection bias. The study uses a convenient sample from Africa; it is confined to countries for which data is available. Even if a positive relationship emerges between the independent and dependent variable, one could argue that results can only be extended to countries with similar infrastructures capable of supporting surveys conducted by Afrobarometer.

Chapter Three: Basic Needs Satisfaction and Dimensions of Democracy

Before testing for any relationships between democracy and poverty, I first describe the basic variables as well as recent changes of each variable over the time period in question. I will consider the three components of food, water and healthcare satisfaction and the index of basic needs satisfaction (BNS). For each of the components and the index, I will discuss the initial and final levels of satisfaction and present graphs representing the countries that have increased and decreased in BNS between rounds one and three of the Afrobarometer surveys. The changes in BNS will be used as the dependent variable for both hypotheses, while the initial and final levels provide an overall picture of the level of basic needs satisfaction among the countries.

I will also discuss the five dimensions of democracy and how each changed between 1998 and 2004. First, I will discuss the initial conditions of democracy, which will be used for the independent variable of hypothesis (1) and as a control for hypothesis (2). I will then use graphs to show the countries that have increased and decreased between the initial and final democracy measurements; these changes represent the independent variable for the second hypothesis. Finally, I will mention the final level of democracy in each country to provide a recent snapshot of democracy in the region.

Lastly, I will discuss the most likely confounding 'third' variable. I will use the initial condition of wealth, PPP GNI per capita, as a control in hypothesis (1) and (2). This context of the dependent, independent and 'third' variable lays the groundwork for the analysis in chapter four.

I. Basic Needs Satisfaction

Basic needs satisfaction is determined by the percentage of people who have 'never gone without' food, water or healthcare. Each component, food, water and healthcare satisfaction, is described as a percentage. The BNS index is generated by the principle components method on a scale between -2 and 2 but is converted to a percentage using the formula $[(x+2)/4] \times 100$. Between the initial surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 and most recent surveys from 2005 there has been little aggregate change for group of countries, but there has been wide fluctuation within individual countries.⁶³

Between 1999 and 2005 food satisfaction across these countries was consistently 43 percent.⁶⁴ Nonetheless some country scores have increased as much as 18 percent while others decreased more than 16 percent. During the same period water satisfaction remained near 50 percent, but has increased by nearly 6 percent and decreased by 10 percent within countries. Healthcare satisfaction across these countries has hovered between 41 and 42 percent. Despite such consistency, some countries degraded by 25 percent and others improved by 20 percent.⁶⁵



Assessing the components of basic needs satisfaction exemplifies the diversity of experiences among countries. First, I describe both the highest and lowest initial percentages of people who have 'never gone without' food, water or healthcare. Then I describe the countries that have experienced either positive or negative change, giving most attention to changes over five percent. Graphs of the change succeed each narrative. Finally, I discuss the final levels of basic needs satisfaction.

Food Satisfaction

In 1998 Zambia, Lesotho and Namibia had the lowest food satisfaction. Between 25 to 28 percent of the people living in these countries had 'never gone without food.' At the same time 67 percent of Ghana's citizens and 59 percent of Nigerians never went without food; half of people in Botswana experienced food satisfaction.

Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa had the greatest improvements in food satisfaction, with changes of 18, 16 and 12 percent respectively. Zambia and Botswana improved somewhat (Figure 5). Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Malawi experienced the greatest decay, with negative changes of nearly 16 percent in each of the countries. Ghana only decreased a little (Figure 6).

Currently only 18 percent of people in Zimbabwe have 'never gone without food.' A low percentage is satisfied in Zambia and Malawi. In Ghana, South Africa and Botswana at least half of people experience food satisfaction (For complete data see Appendix B).





Water Satisfaction

In 1998 around 40 percent of citizens of Zambia, Nigeria, Lesotho and Zimbabwe had 'never gone without water.' An astonishing 70 percent of Botswana citizens never went without water in 1998, while more than 60 percent experienced water satisfaction in Ghana and South Africa.

While Malawi was the only country to improve water satisfaction by more than five percent of their population, Namibia, Lesotho, Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana improved modestly (Figure 7). Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana diminished in water satisfaction by 10, 9 and 8 percent respectively (Figure 8).

Currently Zambia and Zimbabwe have the lowest levels of water satisfaction around 30 percent. Botswana, Ghana and South Africa are now the only countries where more than 60 percent of citizens never go without water (For complete data see Appendix C).





Healthcare Satisfaction

In 1998 only 20 percent of people in Zambia never went without healthcare. Healthcare satisfaction was below 30 percent in Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. At initial measurements 60 percent of citizens in Botswana and Nigeria never went without healthcare.

Namibia, South Africa and Malawi improved substantially in healthcare satisfaction, each gaining between 15 and 20 percent (Figure 9). Ghana and Zambia also minimally advanced. Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Nigeria significantly dropped in healthcare satisfaction, by 15, 20 and 24 percent respectively (Figure 10). Botswana degraded a bit.

By 2005 13 percent of Zimbabwe's citizens never went without healthcare. At the end of the period Botswana, South Africa and Ghana were the only countries where more than half of citizens never went with out healthcare (For complete data see Appendix D).



BNS Index


Creating an index is justifiable at the micro and macro level. Afrobarometer researchers contend that responses of individuals tend to be consistent across components of basic needs satisfaction.⁶⁶ Additionally, at the country level the components can be combined into an index.


Initial measurements of food, water and health satisfaction can be combined using the principle components method of extraction for factor analysis. The resulting Cronbach's alpha, which measures how well variables can be combined into "a single uni-dimensional latent construct,"⁶⁷ is high for both initial (0.81) and final levels (0.94) of satisfaction. The construct is more uni-dimensional as the alpha value approaches the numerical value of one, the construct is more multidimensional as alpha nears zero. These high values mean that food, water and healthcare satisfaction are consistent with one another and can be combined into a basic needs satisfaction index, or BNS.⁶⁸

In 1998 Zambia had the lowest level of basic needs satisfaction at 17 percent. Namibia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho also had low BNS as 27, 31 and 37 percent were satisfied, respectively. Initial measurements of Botswana and Ghana were over 80 percent basic needs satisfaction, followed by South Africa at 63 percent.

Namibia experienced the most drastic improvement in basic needs satisfaction (28 percent) followed by South Africa (18 percent). Malawi and Lesotho both improved BNS by four percent (Figure 11). Basic needs satisfaction decreased in Botswana by nine percent and dropped by 21 percent in Nigeria and Zimbabwe (Figure 12).

By 2005 nine percent of Zimbabweans, the lowest of all countries, had their basic needs satisfied. Zambia experienced 18 percent BNS. At the final measurement Botswana, Ghana, South Africa outpaced all other countries by each achieving approximately 80 percent BNS (For complete data see Appendix A).





II. The Extent of Democracy

The following sections will detail the empirical results across the countries in question for each of the dimensions of democracy. First, I will summarize overall changes for the aggregate country scores, to see if there are any trends shared by most of the countries. Second, I will describe the initial level of democracy, which will be used as the independent variable for hypothesis (1) and as a control for hypothesis (2). Next, I will discuss and visually depict the countries that have increased on that democratic measure and those that have decreased. Finally, I will outline the final state of democracy on that dimension. After discussing the dimensions independently, I will compare and contrast countries' performances on different dimensions and consider the possibility of forming an index.

a. Rule of Law



The World Bank's *Governance Matters IV* rating of 'Control of Corruption' indicates rule of law in this analysis. The rating places the bulk of these countries well below ideal levels of rule of law. In 1998 the average score was -0.2 on a scale of -2 to 2. Two years later the mean of the countries scores improved to -0.1 but the scores varied more widely across the region. Over the period from 2000 to 2004, the countries were less able to control corruption and dropped in their conglomerate score to -0.3.⁶⁹

Botswana and South Africa had the highest control of corruption at the initial measurement at 0.53 and 0.42 respectively. Namibia was the only country to have a substantially positive score with 0.24. Nigeria had the least control of corruption in 1998 with a score of -1.01. Uganda, Zambia, Malawi and Ghana were relatively negative, ranging from -0.4 to -0.6.

Botswana and Ghana improved significantly by 0.33 and 0.27 respectively. South Africa has tightened controls slightly (Figure 13). Control of corruption in the majority of countries has

declined. Notably Malawi by dropped by 0.33; Zimbabwe has floundered with a decrease of 0.88 (Figure 14).

Botswana retains the tightest control of corruption at 0.86, followed at a distance by South Africa at 0.48. Namibia is the only other positive score (0.18) as of 2004. While Uganda, Zambia and Malawi have little control on their corruption, Nigeria and Zimbabwe are the most corrupt countries with scores of -1.11 and -1.01 (For complete data see Appendix F).



b. Civil and Political Freedoms and Equality

Three indicators from Freedom House represent freedoms and equality: Freedom of the Press, Civil Liberties and Political Rights. Press freedoms across the group of countries have gradually improved from 1998 to 2004. The mean score has risen four points—from 50 to 54 on a scale of 100—over the six-year period. This score is a reversal of Freedom House's original scale in order for higher numbers to represent greater press freedom. Under this scale countries are


considered 'not free' with a score of 0 to 40, 'partly free' when scoring 40 to 69 and 'free' for 70 to 100.⁷⁰


South Africa, Botswana and Namibia began the period of study with the greatest press freedoms— all with scores of 70 or above. Malawi and Uganda were classified as partly free with scores of 60. Lesotho, Zambia, Ghana and Zimbabwe were on the margin of partly free and not free. Nigeria was well behind the rest and not free with a rating of 7.

Freedom of the press improved by 18 points in Lesotho and drastically improved in Ghana and Nigeria, with jumps of 32 and 40 respectively (Figure 15). Lesotho moved within the partly free range. Nigeria rocketed from virtually no freedom to the middle range of partly free. Ghana was merely on the verge of becoming partially free in 1998, but leapt all the way to a free press. South Africa increased press freedom by a mere 4 points, while Botswana merely fluctuated.

Zimbabwe and Malawi experienced the largest degradations of press freedoms with decreases of 28 and 12 respectively (Figure 16). Namibia degraded slightly, but retains a free press. Malawi dropped through the range of partial freedom and Uganda dipped a little. While on the threshold of partial freedom in 1998, Zimbabwe was thoroughly not free by 2004; Zambia also degraded to not free.

By 2004 South Africa, Ghana and Botswana remain the only countries to score above 70. Press in Zimbabwe is much more tightly controlled than in any other country. Most of the countries are partly free. Zambia and Zimbabwe, both on the border of partial freedom initially, are now the only presses considered not free (For complete data see Appendix G).







Political rights and civil liberties remained relatively constant between 1998 and 2004. Using Freedom House's seven-point scale, but reversing it to make higher numbers connote more freedom, mean political rights improved only 0.1 (to 3.7) and civil liberties remained the same (3.6). The following graphs combine civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) simply by adding them together and dividing by two $((CL+PR)/2)$. By reversing Freedom House labels, 0-1.5 is considered 'not free,' 2-4 is regarded as 'partly free' and 4.5-6 is 'free.'⁷¹

South Africa had the highest respect for political rights and civil liberties in 1998; Nigeria and Zimbabwe had the lowest. South Africa, Botswana, Malawi and Namibia were free; all other countries were considered partly free.

Civil liberties and political rights in Ghana and Lesotho improved the most; both achieve the label of free (Figure 17). Zambia and Nigeria remained partly free but improved slightly. Rights and liberties decayed most drastically in Malawi and Zimbabwe (Figure 18). Malawi dropped from free to partly free; Uganda declined slightly but remained partly free; and Zimbabwe moved from the verge of partly free to solidly not free.

Botswana, South Africa and Namibia remained unchanged and the strongest protectors of rights. Zimbabwe continues to show the least respect for political rights and civil liberties. Five countries in the region are considered free by final measure, compared to four initially. Four more are partially free while Zimbabwe is the only country that is not free (For complete data see Appendices H and I).





c. Participation

To measure participation I will use data from IFES to calculate the ratio of voter turnout to voters registered.⁷² All the countries in question have had two election years since 1998. Participation has varied widely among countries and has changed quite dramatically between elections in given countries.

Participation ranged from 48 to 94 percent in the first election. Malawi and South Africa achieved the highest turnout with 94 and 89 percent respectively. In stark contrast Zimbabwe and Nigeria had turnouts of 48 and 53 percent respectively.

Participation in Ghana increased by 25 percent, Namibia by 22 percent and Nigeria by 17 percent (Figure 19). Participation was more than cut in half in Malawi, falling by 56 percent (Figure 20). Participation dropped by 11 percent in South Africa and five percent in Lesotho.⁷³

Most recent measures show that Ghana and Namibia have the best participation with 85 percent. Malawi and Zimbabwe are the only countries to have less than half of registered voters turnout for elections (For complete data see Appendix 1).




d. Competition

I use the *Polity IV* measure of 'Political Competition' to represent competition.⁷⁴ Using the eight countries in which data is available at all four measurements, the indicator exhibits little aggregate change across the countries.⁷⁵ There is also very little change within individual countries.

In 1998 Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Malawi were the most competitive, all receiving scores of nine. Uganda and Zimbabwe were the least competitive with score of two. Lesotho and Nigeria were not rated.

Ghana was the only country to improve. Malawi was the only one to decline. Each country changed by one point.

In 2004 Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Ghana were the most competitive. Uganda and Zimbabwe remained the least competitive. Upon being ranked Lesotho received a seven and Nigeria a five (Figure 21) (For complete data see Appendix K).



e. Accountability

The World Bank and *Polity IV* provide useful measures for accountability. The World Bank's *Governance Matters IV* has an indicator entitled 'Voice and Accountability' that seeks to gauge the amount of input people can have in the government.⁷⁶ The measure corresponds to the concept of vertical accountability because it stretches between the people and the government. *Polity IV* has two sub concepts, 'Executive Constraints' and 'Executive Recruitment,' that correspond with horizontal accountability.⁷⁷ These indicators measure the openness and the limits of the executive, primarily within the framework of the government.



Vertical Accountability

The World Bank's 'Voice and Accountability' ranks the majority of these countries negatively, but the average rating has risen slightly (+0.06) from 1998 to 2004.⁷⁸

In 1998 only South Africa, Botswana and Namibia were positively rated, receiving scores of 0.87, 0.77 and 0.42 respectively. Nigeria was the most poorly rated with a rating of -1.48. The other strongly negative countries were Zimbabwe (-0.73), Uganda (-0.61) and Ghana (-0.53).

Nigeria increased dramatically by 0.84. Ghana moved by an astounding 0.92 and Lesotho pushed steadily upwards by 0.29; significantly these countries also moved from negative to positive scores (Figure 22). Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia experienced the most severe declines in their ratings with drops of 0.75, 0.40 and 0.25 respectively (Figure 23).⁷⁹

At the final time of measurement in 2004, there was a stark divide between countries with positive ratings (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Ghana and Lesotho) and the rest with quite negative scores. Even amongst many negative scores, Zimbabwe's score of -1.48 stands out as the worst 'Voice and Accountability' (For complete data see Appendix L).




Horizontal Accountability

Polity IV rating of 'Executive Recruitment' assesses executive transfers, the competitiveness of executive selection, and the openness of executive recruitment. The scores of individual countries are spread from three to eight, thus covering most of the zero-to-ten scale. The aggregated score across countries has improved (+0.88).⁸⁰

In 1998 Botswana and South Africa had the most regulation of executive recruitment denoted by their scores of eight. Malawi and Namibia scored seven. Uganda five and Zimbabwe scored the lowest with three.

Zambia improved by a striking four points and Ghana increased by three. None of the countries experienced any decline.

Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho and South Africa currently enjoy the best rating of 'Executive Recruitment' with scores of eight. Zimbabwe maintained the lowest score with a three. When Nigeria's rating was available, it was a seven (Figure 24) (For complete data see Appendix M).




The *Polity IV* measure of 'Executive Constraints' represents "constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives."⁸¹ Individual scores are spread across a range from two to seven. Across all countries over the period of time in question there was a mean increase of 0.25.⁸²

Botswana and South Africa had the highest scores at the initial measurement. Uganda and Zimbabwe received the lowest ratings of two. All other rated countries received five or six.

Ghana improved by two points and Malawi improved by one point. Zimbabwe was the only country to decline and dropped by one point.

Botswana, South Africa and Lesotho retain the highest ratings with seven. Executives in Uganda and Zimbabwe face the least constraints. Nigeria received a final score of five (Figure 25) (For complete data see Appendix N).



Summary of Democratic Context

What this descriptive review of the basic evidence shows, is that the extent of democracy is dynamic. In general, across the ten countries accountability and freedoms have improved while the rule of law has deteriorated. And while competition and participation remain unchanged overall, they vary widely across countries. These dimensions seem to vary in a consistent way across countries.

Democracy in Zimbabwe is certainly on the decline as the country experienced the most negative change in almost every dimension. The overall level of democracy in Zimbabwe is now lower than other countries across virtually all dimensions. While Malawi underwent many negative changes, it does not experience as low an overall quality of democracy as Zimbabwe. Compared with other countries, Zambia scored most poorly on the freedom measures of democracy, while Nigeria and Uganda received low scores compared with other countries for rule of law and accountability.

Ghana has improved democracy on every dimension. Lesotho also deepened democracy across almost all dimensions. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia, followed closely by Ghana and Lesotho, score above other countries on most dimensions.

Accountability presented some interesting empirical findings, appearing to confirm to the analytical distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability. In some countries, these measures moved in disparate directions. Zambia, for instance, improved in 'Executive Recruitment' but declined in 'Voice and Accountability.' Similarly, Malawi improved in 'Executive Constraints' but declined in 'Voice and Accountability.' The *Polity IV* measures primarily test accountability of the executive within government (horizontal accountability) while the World Bank measure considers accountability more broadly as the link between government and the people (vertical accountability).⁸³

Although there are general trends across these countries, the dimensions democracy do not always move in the same direction. These findings suggest that democracy is complex and

multidimensional and caution against relying on one aggregate measure. There are a variety of explanations for these disparities. The first is that changes in dimensions of democracy do not always occur together and can happen at different times and speeds, even if part of the same interconnected process. Another possibility is that the dimensions are independent or distinct from one another and do not necessarily change together as part of one overarching democratic process. However, a broader sample of countries measured over a longer time period would be necessary to settle this question.

A third possibility is that these indicators are inadequate representations of the concepts they intend to measure. This is most likely to apply to participation measures, as they only represent political participation at discrete points (i.e. elections). A final possibility is that these dimensions chosen to measure democracy should not be conceptually linked because one or more concept or sub-concept is not 'democratic.' Horizontal accountability may not be inherently democratic,⁸⁴ but it is often considered necessary to democratic governance. Despite differences between variables, all dimensions of democracy are sufficiently similar to form an index of dispersed power, a point I will now address.

Dispersed Power Index

The dimensions of democracy described above seem to tap a common underlying aspect of democracy that I call dispersed power. In chapter two I described how each dimension could embody elements of dispersed power like limited, separated or shared power. While this theoretical justification is necessary to form an index, the indicators must also correlate with one another.

Forming an index is empirically justifiable. The initial measurements of the dimensions of democracy vary together with a Cronbach's alpha⁸⁵ of 0.69. The final measurements of the dimensions have an alpha of 0.71. The closer these numbers are to the number one, the more the indicators vary together.


Forming a dispersed power index is useful to make broad comparisons with basic needs satisfaction, but analyzing each of the dimensions of democracy remains the prominent focus of this analysis. I am discussing a potential index because the notion of dispersed power does seem to have some validity. While aggregating the indicators may contribute to the literature with the concept of dispersed power, exploring the individual impacts of the dimensions remains of paramount importance in understanding the complex nature of democracy.

Using dispersed power as a general guide to judge democracy provides a gross summary of the dimensions of rule of law, political and civil rights, participation, competition and accountability. The countries are very diverse in their levels of dispersed power and the changes during the time period.

In 1998 South Africa and Botswana had the highest level of dispersed power, followed in a distant third by Namibia. Zambia and Uganda had relatively little dispersed power and Zimbabwe had the least dispersion of power amongst the countries sampled.⁸⁶

Dispersed power increased dramatically in Ghana, improved substantially in Zambia and edged up slightly in Namibia. South Africa, Botswana and Uganda degraded on the dispersed power index. Malawi dropped significantly and Zimbabwe plummeted from an already low level.

By 2005 Ghana had pushed past countries with greater previous levels of dispersed power to have the third greatest dispersion of power. South Africa and Botswana maintained the highest levels of dispersed power. Namibia and Lesotho also have a decent amount of dispersed power by recent measures. Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria have little dispersion of power. Uganda is has even less power dispersion while Zimbabwe has the least amount of dispersed power (Figure 26) (For complete data see Appendix O).⁸⁷




The Potentially Confounding Impact of Wealth

Before discussing any empirical relationships between dimensions of democracy and basic needs satisfaction, it is necessary to acknowledge the potential impact of other 'third' variables. If I am successful in establishing a clear relationship between democracy and basic needs satisfaction, critics may contend that this relationship is simply due to prior levels of wealth, which simultaneously affect both democratic progress and the satisfaction of basic needs.

Thus before concluding this chapter, I present some descriptive evidence about the overall wealth of the countries in question. In order to measure national wealth, I use Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, calculated using purchasing power parity.⁸⁸ The World Bank uses this method of calculation "for accurate measurement of poverty and well-being" because it most accurately measures the capacity of an individual to purchase goods or services within a given country.⁸⁹ Upon visual inspection, there is a distinct separation between lower-middle income and upper-middle income countries.⁹⁰

South Africa, Botswana and Namibia were much more wealthy than the rest of the countries in 1998, enjoying a GNI per capita of at least double the rest. While all other countries were

considered low-income countries, Malawi was the poorest country in terms of GNI per capita (Figure 27) (For complete data see Appendix P).



Initial Observations about BNS and Dispersed Power

Even through casual visual inspection of the data, there are obvious similarities between basic needs satisfaction and measures of dispersed power. South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho usually score in the top half on both measures, either by level or change. Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe tend to appear at the bottom of both variable rankings.

Yet justifying concerns about the confounding impact of wealth, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia also are far above other countries' PPP GNI per capita. Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia have the lowest GNI per capita; Zimbabwe is the only country getting poorer in absolute terms. However, there are also some *prima facie* differences between wealth and dispersed power, Ghana being the most notable example with high levels of dispersed power but ranked low on wealth.

Chapter Four: Research Findings

Two hypotheses guide the empirical testing in this chapter. The first hypothesizes that *initial* levels of democracy (measured as various aspects of dispersed power) correspond with subsequent *changes* in basic needs satisfaction. This conjecture is statistically tested on every dimension of democracy, and then tested again controlling for initial levels of wealth, which addresses concerns that the observed relationship might be spurious, disappearing once I take wealth into account. A correlation with this control will substantiate a relationship independent from a country's wealth.

Hypothesis (1)

- a. Democracy_(initial) → Change in Basic Needs Satisfactionⁱ
- b. Democracy_(initial) → Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction[†]

The second hypothesis speculates that the effect of democracy on BNS might be instantaneous rather than delayed. It hypothesizes a relationship in which changes in democracy correspond with *simultaneous* changes in basic needs satisfaction. I also anticipate questions about whether such an observed relationship is simply a function of initial levels of either wealth or democracy (measured as aspects of dispersed power). I test this in four different ways: (1) the *change* in democracy and the *change* in basic needs satisfaction; (2) the *change* in democracy and the *change* in basic needs satisfaction, *controlling* for the initial level of wealth; (3) the *change* in democracy and the *change* in basic needs satisfaction, controlling for initial levels of democracy; (4) the *change* in democracy and the *change* in basic needs satisfaction, *controlling* for the initial level of democracy and wealth.

Hypothesis (2)

- a. Change in Democracyⁱⁱ → Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction
- b. Change in Democracy → Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction[†]
- c. Change in Democracy[‡] → Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction
- d. Change in Democracy[‡] → Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction[†]

ⁱ Change in Basic Needs Satisfaction = (Basic needs satisfaction_(final) – Basic needs satisfaction_(initial))

[†] Controlling for initial level of wealth

ⁱⁱ Change in Democracy = (Democracy_(final) – Democracy_(initial))

[‡] Controlling for initial level of democracy

I. Hypothesis One

$\text{Democracy}_{(\text{initial})} \rightarrow (\text{Basic needs satisfaction}_{(\text{final})} - \text{Basic needs satisfaction}_{(\text{initial})})$

I test hypothesis (1) both through visual inspections of scatter plots as well as through statistical correlations between initial levels of democracy and changes in basic needs satisfaction.⁹¹ I will discuss the tests done on each dimension of democracy as well as with the overall Dispersed Power Index.

I will then control for initial levels of wealth (PPP GNI per capita), first statistically and then manually separating countries into low and high wealth. A listing of correlations between basic needs satisfaction and democracy in low wealth countries can be found in Appendix S. I will consider Malawi, Zambia, Nigeria, Uganda, Ghana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe to be low wealth and Namibia, Botswana and South Africa to be high wealth. The basis for this division is two-fold.


First of all, the World Bank has labeled countries between a GNI per capita of \$876 and \$3465 “lower-middle income” and countries between \$3466 and \$10725 “upper-middle income.”⁹² Initial levels of the seven low wealth countries, fall below the cut of \$3465 (Zimbabwe’s initial GNI per capita of \$2680 is the highest of the low wealth group). Namibia, Botswana and South Africa are well above the cut; Namibia is the lowest of the high wealth group with an initial GNI per capita of \$5790.

The second reason for such a division is to emphasize the importance of the level of democracy in influencing basic needs satisfaction. My reasoning flies in the face of arguments that assert that certain levels of wealth are a necessary prerequisite for democracy. Previous analyses of democracy have noticed that almost all democracies above a GDP per capita of US\$4000 have remained democracies.⁹³ Those in favor of autocratically guided development below this wealth threshold assert that democracy is a negative rather than a positive influence for poverty reduction.⁹⁴ However, I assert that, especially at low levels of wealth, the level of democracy is vital in contributing to satisfaction of basic needs. If this is the case, the relationship between democracy and basic needs satisfaction should become even stronger when we consider only low wealth countries (below \$US4000 GNI per capita).

a. Rule of Law

Does the extent to which a country observes rule of law affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey data for change in basic needs satisfaction and *Governance Matters IV* 'Control of Corruption' for the initial measure of rule of law. This first test of hypothesis (1) shows that control of corruption as measured in 1998 correlates modestly with changes in BNS over the next six years.

This test shows a modest correlation between control of corruption (measured in 1998) and the change in basic needs satisfaction (Pearson's $r = 0.47$) (Figure 28). The horizontal line denotes the zero point where there is no change in basic needs satisfaction. Amongst only low wealth countries, thus excluding Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, the correlation is further depressed ($r = 0.30$) (Appendix S).



As we will see repeatedly, Zimbabwe appears to be a significant 'outlier.' Explaining the outlying position of Zimbabwe will begin to explain these weak statistical findings. The

regression line in figure 28 predicts that Zimbabwe (given its measured level of control of corruption in 1998) should have done much better in meeting basic needs.

While hypothesis (1) only considers initial level of corruption control, and not changes in control of corruption, it is important to note that the choice of the initial measurement period, in the case of Zimbabwe, makes a huge difference. The World Bank only measures ‘Control of Corruption’ every two years. In 1998 Zimbabwe received a score of -0.13 but in 2000 received a score of -0.87 . This is a large degradation considering it only exists on a scale of -2 to 2 and is nearly three times the magnitude of the next lowest decline.⁹⁵ Thus although it appears Zimbabwe had a moderate control of corruption in 1998, shortly after this initial measure, corruption control collapsed.

Indeed, as is widely known, during this period the situation in Zimbabwe changed dramatically. A constitutional referendum was defeated in February 2000 despite endless campaigning by the Mugabe government, which argued that a vote against the constitution was a vote for colonialism.⁹⁶ The proposed constitution would have provided presidential immunity for any civil or criminal charges while in office and provided the framework for forcible seizure of white owned farms without any remuneration.⁹⁷

Shortly after the defeat of the constitutional referendum, squatters and alleged war veterans—who supposedly fought in the bush war for independence in 1980—forcibly seized hundreds of white owned farms. On 6 April 2000 the Zimbabwean parliament passed an amendment to the constitution allowing “confiscation of farms without compensation” to the farmers. Shortly after the amendment passed, President Robert Mugabe expressed his support for the over 900 farms already taken, extolling those responsible for forcible appropriation and commending them for keeping the “liberation spirit” alive.⁹⁸ This also threw tens of thousands of black farm laborers out of work, and created a massive flight of foreign capital out of the country.

While the political and economic catastrophe in Zimbabwe deserves much more attention than the confines of this analysis allow, it is clear that the unique circumstances and drastic changes make it difficult for initial democracy measures in 1998 to predict changes over the subsequent six-year period. Thus we will repeatedly see that Zimbabwe is an outlier, and I will only discuss the rapid statistical changes in lieu of iterating these contextual factors.


To return to the larger point, initial control of corruption and change in basic needs satisfaction are weakly related. Narrowing the focus to low wealth countries exhibits a weak relationship between initial corruption control and change in basic needs satisfaction, but strengthens when explaining the outlying position of Zimbabwe, which experienced rapid and atypical political change. Thus, initial control of corruption is most related to change in basic needs satisfaction in low wealth countries that have not experienced rapid degradations in corruption control.

b. Political and Civil Freedoms and Equality

Does the extent of civil and political rights affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey data for change in basic needs satisfaction and Freedom House’s ‘Press Freedoms, Civil

Liberties and Political Rights' for the initial measures of rights and liberties. This test of hypothesis (1) shows that rights and freedoms, as measured in 1998, correlate strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years.

Initial freedom of the press correlates quite strongly ($r = 0.69$) with changes in basic needs satisfaction (Figure 29). The correlation remains equally strong when considering low wealth countries ($r = 0.70$) (Appendix R and S). The vertical lines represent the distinctions between freedom as described by Freedom House; countries below 40 are considered not free, scores of 40 to 69 are partly free and 70 and above is free.




Source: Freedom House and Afrobarometer

The main outliers from this potentially very strong relationship are Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia. As high wealth countries, Namibia and Botswana do not seem to fit the trend shared by low wealth countries in their relationship between initial press freedom and changes in BNS. Zimbabwe does not fit the trend shared by other low wealth countries, but this is most likely due to its specific political changes.

While Zimbabwe's press was on the verge of free and partly free, changes have taken place since then to quash free press. Press freedom dropped 28 points from 1998 to 2004, more than double any other decrease within the group.⁹⁹ The rapid change seems to negate any predictive value an initial measure of press freedom had for change in basic needs satisfaction.

Thus, initial freedom of press and subsequent changes in BNS are positively correlated, especially in low wealth countries that have not experienced a recent collapse of press freedom.

Initial political rights and civil liberties are also strongly correlated ($r = 0.68$) with changes in basic needs satisfaction (Figure 30). Among low wealth countries the relationship is slightly stronger ($r = 0.76$) (Appendix R and S). Vertical lines in the graph represent distinctions of not free (0-1.5), partly free (2-4) and free (4.5-6).¹⁰⁰




The overall relationship of initial political and civil freedoms and change in BNS is strong and strengthens when omitting high wealth countries, such as Botswana and Namibia. This suggests that where citizens enjoy political rights and civil liberties, they are more likely to see greater increases in basic need satisfaction (and especially so in low wealth countries).

It is also important to note that press freedoms, political rights and civil liberties all share some basic trends in their relationship with basic needs satisfaction. Initial levels of all types of freedom are important in influencing future changes in basic needs satisfaction. The more freedom citizens of a country have, the more likely their basic needs satisfaction will increase.

c. Participation

Does the extent of participation affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey data for change in basic needs satisfaction and IFES Election Guide voter turnout compared to registered voters. This test of hypothesis (1) shows that participation, as measured in 1998, correlates strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years.


Initial participation is correlated ($r = 0.52$) with subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction (Figure 31). However, the link is far stronger among low wealth countries ($r = 0.81$) (Appendix R and S). The major outlier is Namibia, which exceeded expected changes in basic needs satisfaction given its levels of participation.



d. Competition

Does the extent of competition affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey data for change in basic needs satisfaction and *Polity IV* 'Political Competition' to represent competition. This test of hypothesis (1) shows that competition, as measured in 1998, correlates strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years.

Initial 'Political Competition' correlates very strongly with changes in basic needs satisfaction ($r = 0.71$) (Figure 32).¹⁰¹ Strikingly, the relationship is almost perfect among low wealth countries ($r = 0.99$). Separating the low from high wealth countries suggests that at low levels of wealth, the relationship between political competition and changes in basic needs satisfaction is not affected by wealth. The countries deviating furthest from the overall trend are the high wealth countries of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.



The visual depiction of the relationship presents questions about the 'Political Competition' scale. Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa received the highest political competition

scores in 1998 but had very different ensuing changes in BNS. Although this could possibly signify that political competition is not a good indicator of changes in BNS, it seems more likely that 'Political Competition' makes more of a difference among poorer countries than in relatively wealthy ones. This may be due to the fact that wealthier countries have more developed civil societies that can contribute to fuller policy debate in the absence of effective partisan opposition.

It is also important to note that a score of ten is the maximum score for 'Political Competition,' after which a country cannot improve its score. There is no distinction between a country that recently achieved a nine and one that achieved the rating years ago and has continued to improve. For example, of the four countries with scores of nine, Botswana most recently achieved the score in 1997; Malawi and South Africa have been rated a nine since 1994; and Namibia's score of nine dates back to 1990.¹⁰² The duration a country has been a nine seems to partially explain the variance at the top of the scale—the longer a country has been a nine the more likely it is to change basic needs satisfaction for the better.


While, these four countries may not be as politically competitive, by other definitions, as other countries around the world,¹⁰³ they are rated as equally competitive by the *Polity IV* scale. This is possible because the *Polity IV* scale measures 'Political Competition' on two dimensions: "(1) the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition and (2) the extent of government restriction on political competition." This structural and regulatory approach measures de jure political competition more so than de facto.

Other measures of competition might be necessary to distinguish between countries that have high levels of institutionalized political competition. Such measures might include the extent to which policies are adequately represented by political parties, and thus present viable options for voters. In sum, changes in basic needs satisfaction correlate with initial 'Political Competition' at low and improving levels, but the scale fails to distinguish between countries with high levels of 'Political Competition.'

e. Accountability

Does the extent of accountability affect subsequent levels of basic needs satisfaction? I attempt to empirically demonstrate the relationship between these variables using Afrobarometer survey data for change in basic needs satisfaction, *Governance Matters IV's* 'Voice and Accountability' for vertical accountability and *Polity IV's* 'Executive Recruitment and Constraints' for horizontal accountability. This test of hypothesis (1) shows that vertical accountability, as measured in 1998, correlates strongly with changes in BNS over the next six years, but horizontal accountability has a weaker correlation with changes in BNS.

The data shows that initial 'Voice and Accountability' correlates with changes in basic needs satisfaction ($r = 0.69$) (Figure 33). And that it also strengthens considerably among low wealth countries ($r = 0.86$) (Appendix R and S).




Zimbabwe, again, lies outside the apparent relationship between initial voice and accountability and change in basic needs satisfaction. Although hypothesis (1) does not systematically consider the change in 'Voice and Accountability,' it is relevant to note that Zimbabwe's score fell by 0.24 between 1998 and 2000 and continued to fall to -1.48 in 2004. This decrease of 0.75 over six years was three times the magnitude of the next largest decrease.¹⁰⁴ Thus, Zimbabwe's drastic degradation of 'Voice and Accountability' immediately following the initial measurement accounts for its outlying position.

'Voice and Accountability' is important for subsequent changes in BNS, especially in low wealth countries. Zimbabwe seems to deviate from this common relationship, but this is explained by the rapid degradation of accountability within Zimbabwe since the initial measurement. Thus, initial voice and accountability affects changes in basic needs satisfaction, especially in low wealth countries, except in the case of rapid political decay.

Initial 'Executive Recruitment' correlates modestly with change in basic needs satisfaction ($r = 0.54$) (Figure 34), though strengthening somewhat among low wealth countries ($r = 0.64$) (Appendix R and S).¹⁰⁵ Namibia and Botswana do not fit the trend but are high wealth countries. The surprising outlier here is Zambia.

Figure 34




Source: Polity IV and Afrobarometer

Zambia is particularly low on this measure of democracy, compared to its ratings on other dimensions. Zambia's 1998 'Executive Recruitment' score of three began in 1996 when then President Frederick Chiluba made constitutional amendments intended to prohibit former President Kuanda and other opponents from participating in the 1996 election.¹⁰⁶ This measure may have overreacted to the actual situation in the country, since Kuanda was not a legitimate contender for the office. Indeed, in 2001 supporters of President Chiluba failed in their attempt to circumvent constitutional restrictions of two terms per president.¹⁰⁷ In the absence of Chiluba in the presidential election, eleven parties contested the election and Levy Mwanawasa won by a mere two percent—29 percent over 27 percent.¹⁰⁸

Zambia's jump from a score of three in 2000 to seven in 2001 could have been a result of a real increase in competitiveness in executive recruitment. Alternatively, the drastic numerical change may allude to a misjudgment of Zambia that was corrected quickly when actual events convinced experts of underlying competitiveness. In addition to Zambia only Ghana changed over the six year period and by a mere two points.¹⁰⁹ The unique circumstances in Zambia, meriting rapid change in 'Executive Recruitment' score, explain Zambia's outlying position.

Initial 'Executive Constraints' correlate relatively weakly ($r = 0.41$) with changes in basic needs satisfaction (Figure 35) but the correlation becomes extremely strong among low wealth countries ($r = 0.92$) (Appendix R and S).¹¹⁰ Namibia and Botswana—high wealth countries—deviate most greatly from the trend set by other countries. 'Executive Constraints' appear to have an effect on change in BNS, especially in low wealth countries.




Initial levels of accountability correlate with changes in basic needs satisfaction. The World Bank 'Voice and Accountability' offers the most versatility in ranking capacity and enjoys a strong correlation with change in BNS. All measures of accountability are more strongly correlated among low wealth countries, especially when accounting for specific changes in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Dispersed Power Index

As discussed in chapter three, these aspects of democracy can also be aggregated into an index of dispersed power. While the concept of dispersed power may not be as uni-dimensional as the index of basic needs satisfaction,¹¹¹ a single concept of dispersed power provides a useful way to combine the dimensions of democracy for easy comparison and summary.

Overall initial 'Dispersed Power' correlates modestly ($r = 0.58$) with changes in basic needs satisfaction (Figure 36) and improves among low wealth countries ($r = 0.87$) (Appendix R and S). Botswana and Namibia, both high wealth countries, remain the most prominent outliers in the overall relationship. Zimbabwe's deviation from the trend can be attributed to its drastic political changes explained in section (a) of hypothesis (1).¹¹² Initial levels of democracy influence subsequent change in basic needs satisfaction, especially at low levels of wealth.



Wealth

As the influence of wealth has been discussed throughout the analysis of hypothesis (1), it seems reasonable to briefly discuss the direct relationship between initial wealth and change in basic needs satisfaction. The relationship between initial levels of wealth and change in basic needs satisfaction is only a moderate one ($r = 0.50$)—(stronger only than the correlations between BNS and 'Control of Corruption' and 'Executive Constraints'). And when considering only low wealth countries, the relationship between initial wealth and change in basic needs satisfaction dissolves and reverses directionality ($r = -0.19$) (Appendix S). In other words, amongst poor

countries initial levels of wealth are not positively linked to the change in basic needs satisfaction.

Summary of Hypothesis One Results

Hypothesis (1) asserts that a country's initial levels of democracy are positively related to subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction. My statistical analysis confirmed that all initial dimensions of democracy are indeed positively correlated with changes in basic needs satisfaction. The strongest relationships existed between 'Freedom of the Press,' 'Political Rights and Civil Liberties,' 'Political Competition' and 'Voice and Accountability' with correlations of 0.69, 0.67, 0.71 and 0.69 respectively. Slightly weaker correlations arose between 'Participation' and 'Executive Recruitment' (0.52 and 0.54). 'Control of Corruption' and 'Executive Constraints' shared the weakest relationships with changes in basic needs satisfaction (0.47 and 0.41).

And nearly all correlations between initial measurements of democracy and changes in BNS strengthen when considering only low wealth countries. Changes in basic needs satisfaction correlated with 'Political Competition' at 0.99, 'Executive Constraints' at 0.92, 'Voice and Accountability' at 0.86, and 'Participation' at 0.81. 'Political and Civil Freedoms' and 'Press Freedom' correlations with BNS increased modestly to 0.76 and 0.70, respectively. 'Executive Recruitment' correlates with BNS at 0.64. 'Control of Corruption' was the only dimension to decrease its correlation among low wealth countries (0.30).

The strong positive correlations between the initial democracy measurements and change in basic needs satisfaction strongly suggest that democracy (measured as dispersed power) helps reduce poverty and that higher levels of democracy provide more help than lower levels. This empirical research supports claims that democracy can reduce poverty but suggests that the gratification is delayed.

II. Hypothesis Two

$$(\text{Democracy}_{(\text{final})} - \text{Democracy}_{(\text{initial})}) : (\text{Basic needs satisfaction}_{(\text{final})} - \text{Basic needs satisfaction}_{(\text{initial})})$$

Beyond a delayed effect of democracy on basic needs satisfaction, I wonder if democracy and BNS change contemporaneously. The second hypothesis asserts that citizens who live in a country where democracy is improving will also experience an improvement in BNS. Such a finding would mean that improvements in democracy would immediately reduce poverty.

The statistical tests for hypothesis (2) consider correlations between changes in level of democracy and changes in basic needs satisfaction. This section discusses the tests done on each dimension of democracy including the dispersed power index. I control for initial levels of wealth (PPP GNI per capita), first statistically and then manually separating countries into low and high wealth. I also control for initial levels of democracy and then control for democracy and wealth together.

Tests for hypothesis (2) produced no substantial correlations. These results do not support the assertion that democracy and basic needs satisfaction change together or that changes in democracy have an immediate effect on BNS. A listing of overall correlations is in Appendix R; correlations between basic needs satisfaction and democracy in low wealth countries are in Appendix S.

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Chapter Five: Conclusions

Does democracy, conceptualized as dispersed power, reduce poverty? I have argued that higher levels of democracy can indeed reduce subsequent levels of poverty. A high level democracy creates an environment conducive to innovation, experimentation and incremental change. I have systematically outlined how the initial level of democracy should lead to changes in basic needs satisfaction. And in order to go beyond mere correlation, I arranged a longitudinal design that established time order, and I controlled for the confounding impact of wealth.

My research covers a six-year period of time and ten countries on one continent. The use of measures that can be replicated allows for future tests of similar hypotheses over various times and spaces. The systematic nature of the research provides transparency and reliability creating the possibility for generalizing results. Consequently, this study produces avenues for further academic research and provides grounds for certain policy recommendations.

Theoretical Foundation

In order to address the issue of poverty reduction, I reframed the dependent variable as *basic needs satisfaction* (BNS). This new concept provided a positive construct, instead of the *absence* of poverty. Using Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs to specify physiological human needs of food, water and healthcare, the Afrobarometer survey data provides a measurement of basic needs satisfaction.

To conceptualize democracy, I created a construct called *dispersed power*. The ideas underlying dispersed power—limited, separated and shared power—were derived from James Madison and the *Federalist Papers*. To analyze the complex system of democracy, I extracted dimensions of democracy from Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino's work: rule of law, political and civil freedoms and equality, participation, competition and accountability.¹¹³ I used data and widely accepted indicators from Freedom House, IFES, *Polity IV* and the World Bank to measure these dimensions of democracy.

I used indicators of democracy that describe dispersed power. The 'Control of Corruption' indicator from the World Bank measures respect for rule of law and the possible subsequent limitation on power. The Freedom House indicators of 'Freedom of the Press, Civil Liberties and Political Rights' can represent sharing of power within society. Participation, calculated from IFES data as a ratio election turnout to registered voters, can exhibit further shared power within society. *Polity IV*'s 'Political Competition' can provide a useful judge of the separation of power between different interests in government. Finally, *Polity IV* measures of accountability can provide insight into the limitations within government and World Bank measures can allude to the separation of power between government and citizens.

Democracy reduces poverty, or improves basic needs satisfaction, due to its unique capacity to foster innovation, experimentation and incremental change. First, a democratic society with dispersed power provides an environment conducive to advancing new ideas because individuals are rewarded for their creativity. Second, democratic societies can experiment with different ideas, halting bad ones and pursuing the best ideas based solely on their merit. Promoting the

free-flow of ideas and preempting negative repercussions of bad ideas enables countries to develop policies and practices that are best suited to their specific situations; this allows incremental change. When in a democratic society, incremental change will meet the needs of the people, which begin with basic physiological needs.

Methodological Fortitude

I developed a cross-national, longitudinal research design including ten African countries from 1998 to 2004. This sample size enabled tests for correlation, in order to demonstrate covariance between dimensions of democracy and basic needs satisfaction. The time span allowed the study to demonstrate time order, although data availability unfortunately limited the time period. Finally, accounting for potentially confounding impact of wealth provided additional credence for claims of causation instead of mere correlation.¹¹⁴

Empirical Findings

Tests of hypothesis (1) revealed that initial measurements of democracy are indeed positively related to subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction, especially at low levels of wealth. This is important because it empirically demonstrates that poor countries do not need to become wealthy to reduce poverty; these countries can more effectively meet the basic needs of citizens by improving their level of democracy. Once at higher levels of democracy, basic needs satisfaction will begin to increase accordingly.

The positive correlations between democracy and change in basic needs satisfaction are consistent with Halperin *et al.*'s theory of a democracy advantage and the underlying reasons for such an advantage. My concept of dispersed power addresses Halperin *et al.*'s conjecture that innovation, experimentation and incremental change are the driving force behind the democracy advantage. The dimensions of democracy, measured as dispersed power, all correlate relatively strongly with subsequent change in basic needs satisfaction. Freedoms, political competition and vertical accountability enjoyed the strongest relationships while control of corruption had the weakest. Nonetheless, the dimensions of democracy can be combined into an index of dispersed power. This index should not supplant the multidimensional analysis but rather provide empirical proof that the dimensions of democracy are related under the umbrella of dispersed power.

Initial measures of wealth do not predict changes in basic needs satisfaction as well as initial levels of democracy. Moreover, the correlation between initial levels of democracy and subsequent changes in basic needs satisfaction are *not* due to the fact that more democratic countries are wealthier. In fact, the correlation between dispersed power and changes in BNS strengthen considerably amongst poor countries.

Tests for correlations regarding hypothesis (2) revealed that the effects of democracy are not instantaneous. Changes in democracy are not immediately accompanied by contemporaneous changes in basic needs satisfaction.

This may be due to the fact that some measures of democracy remained relatively static during the period of time in question. Specifically, the *Polity IV* measures hardly fluctuated, probably because they measure structural conditions. Freedom house scales also changed little during this period. This lack of fluidity may have inhibited the possibility that democracy and BNS would fluctuate together.

Alternatively, the results of hypotheses (2) may suggest that there is a time delay in the effect of democracy on poverty reduction. From any given point, the benefits of democracy for development are not instantaneous but delayed by at least several years.

Future Research

This analysis is systematic and transparent, making it replicable and reliable. By using widely accepted indicators, other researchers can conduct studies using different countries and time periods. But there are some basic limitations that can be improved upon to enhance further research.

The major limitation is data for basic needs satisfaction. This study utilized the greatest number of countries available over the longest period of time using Afrobarometer data. A more comprehensive study using Afrobarometer would be possible in the future, when more years are available and for more countries. Alternatively, other studies could use different indicators to describe basic needs satisfaction. Possibilities for sources include Latinobarometro,¹¹⁵ New Europe Barometer¹¹⁶ or Asian Barometer.¹¹⁷

Future studies could also go beyond the widely accepted indicators used here and attempt to create more conceptually valid indicators. In fact, the process of creating or improving the validity of one indicator could be an entire research project. Many broad studies will suffice to match concepts with available indicators, while a few should focus on improving the indicators used to measure democracy.

The authors of the various chapters in *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* edited by Diamond and Morlino, give suggestions on how to better empirically measure the concepts of rule of law, civil and political freedoms and equality and accountability.¹¹⁸ Although Diamond and Morlino include participation and competition in the dimensions of democracy, they do not include a chapter dedicated to either one. I will briefly mention how each of these indicators could be improved.

The current participation indicator only considers the ratio of voter turnout to registered voters in an election. Considering the ratio of registered voters to voter aged population may allow some further understanding of electoral participation. But while this would improve the measure, it would only gauge political participation at one point in time. A more valid measure of participation would include ongoing civil and political participation measures, such as involvement in political parties or social organizations.¹¹⁹

The chosen measure of competition is a reliable measure from *Polity IV*, but it seems to reach a plateau where countries become as structurally politically competitive as they can. This

indicator only considers the extent to which a candidate theoretically could lose or win an election, based on the structures in place. A better measure of competition would capture the actual likelihood that a political candidate could lose an election based on actual election results.

Implications and Recommendations

This analysis builds on earlier work from *The Democracy Advantage*, published in 2005 by Morton Halperin and his colleagues. In their book Halperin *et al.* make the case that “democracy does a better job raising living standards in poor countries than does authoritarian government.”¹²⁰ After empirically justifying their claims that higher democratic quality¹²¹ does indeed raise the quality of social welfare,¹²² Halperin *et al.* provide policy suggestions. Having authenticated their argument using multiple dimensions of democracy in the context of ten African countries, I will reexamine Halperin *et al.*’s recommendations.¹²³

Changing the view of Change

The overarching implication of this research suggests that relying on democracy is better than “relying on enlightened autocrats” to systematically promote development.¹²⁴ Rather than hoping that benign dictators and their policy advisors, armed with advanced degrees in development economics, will emerge to improve developing countries, donor countries should support democracies, especially those democracies that more evenly disperse power, information and responsibility. This dispersed power of democracies enables a process of innovation, experimentation and incremental change.

To adopt a mindset conducive to development through dispersed power, we must begin by realizing that, although the West has achieved a high degree of wealth, it does not already have all the answers for development. There is no universally applicable laundry list of prescriptions. When we realize we still have much to learn, we begin to appreciate the need for innovation and experimentation.

Adopting a notion of incremental change has multifaceted implications for our approach to development. First, such change cannot and will not take place immediately—it is gradual. This means that lasting differences are unlikely to take place within the span of a political term. Secondly, to be lasting, appropriate and effective, change must be internally driven and guided. This means that external assistance must be applied according to internal priorities. Finally, change is intentional. Merely hoping that poverty will diminish and economies will develop is not enough; we must make a conscious effort to enact change.

Amending Foreign Aid Distribution

The view that democracy is advantageous for poverty reduction and development has multiple implications for foreign aid distribution. Most prominently, “Preferential support for development assistance and debt relief should be provided to democracies...Resources will be more effectively used and [give] a clear incentive for political reform.”¹²⁵ Since there is only a finite amount of aid available, it should be channeled towards democratic countries¹²⁶ where the funds will be used to improve democracy and subsequently reduce poverty.

In light of the above argument for incremental change, and it nearly goes without saying, aid distributors should familiarize themselves with the aid recipients prior to allocation. Donors should continue to work alongside recipients, making achievable and measurable goals that do not simply evaluate macroeconomic development but also assess democratic progress and social welfare. To fund a greater variety of programs, aid distributors should expand aid channels beyond national government to provincial, private sector and nongovernmental organizations.

Diversifying funding recipients will begin to disperse power. Furthering the formation of an independent judiciary and police force will enhance the rule of law. Funding journalists, publicists and activists will advance civil and political freedoms. Donating to budding civil society groups will boost participation. Encouraging the separation of party and state financing¹²⁷ will burgeon competition. Strengthening the legislature and ensuring an independent civil service will further augment accountability. These are only a few examples of the contributions to dispersed power that will eventually contribute to poverty reduction.

A Concluding Note

This paper makes the case that democracy can reduce poverty. The exigency for such a discourse derives from the discrepancy of the causal direction of the relationship between democracy and development. Building on theoretical underpinnings introduced by Amartya Sen and the empirical demonstration by Morton Halperin *et al.* in *The Democracy Advantage*, this paper argues that the dispersed power within democracy contributes to the satisfaction of citizens' basic physiological needs. This conjecture is systematically and empirically tested over a six-year period using ten developing countries in Africa.

The data reveals that higher levels of democracy correspond to subsequent increases in basic needs satisfaction—reductions in poverty—especially at low levels of wealth. These findings confirm Halperin *et al.*'s assertion that democracy holds an advantage over authoritarianism by improving social welfare in developing countries. Furthermore, the results of this study detail how dispersing power within government and between government and society allows for development through innovation, experimentation and incremental change. These conclusions offer great promise for foreign aid distributors because they suggest democracy and economic development need not be viewed as competing priorities in developing countries. Democracy not only protects inalienable rights but also can help to satisfy basic needs.

6. Appendix

A. Basic Needs Satisfaction Index by percentage (Afrobarometer)

	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Botswana	86.8	82.7	77.3
Ghana	81.5	64.6	81.2
Lesotho	37.2	24.5	41.3
Malawi	40.6	27.6	45.6
Namibia	26.9	70.2	55.3
Nigeria	65.6	41.0	44.6
South Africa	63.2	90.4	82.0
Uganda	NA	42.7	45.9
Zambia	16.9	33.2	17.6
Zimbabwe	31.2	23.1	9.2

B. 'Never Gone Without Food' by percentage (Afrobarometer)

	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Botswana	50.7	48.5	52
Ghana	67.2	59.8	64.2
Lesotho	27.6	20.2	43.8
Malawi	43.5	16.8	28.5
Namibia	28.3	57.2	46.9
Nigeria	58.7	54.9	42.2
South Africa	48	62.7	59.7
Uganda	NA	47.2	43.4
Zambia	25.5	22.9	28.1
Zimbabwe	34.5	18.5	18.5

C. 'Never Gone Without Water' by percentage (Afrobarometer)

	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Botswana	70.8	68.3	63
Ghana	60.7	57.6	62.7
Lesotho	41.9	49.3	44.7
Malawi	47.5	52.3	53.1
Namibia	44.8	61.3	49.1
Nigeria	40.4	35.3	42.5
South Africa	62.6	72.7	65.1
Uganda	NA	49.5	49.4
Zambia	38.1	53.4	28.5
Zimbabwe	42.7	49.3	33.9

D. 'Never Gone Without Healthcare' by percentage (Afrobarometer)

	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Botswana	68.7	70.8	61.8
Ghana	53.3	45.2	56
Lesotho	48.9	20.6	29.4
Malawi	27.6	24.5	42.7
Namibia	25.4	51.8	45.5
Nigeria	63.9	40.1	39.8
South Africa	41.3	66	59.2
Uganda	NA	29.2	32
Zambia	20.3	27.5	24.3
Zimbabwe	28.4	19.5	12.6

E. Changes in Basic Needs Satisfaction by percentage (Afrobarometer)

	Food	Water	Healthcare	Total
Botswana	1.3	-7.8	-6.9	-9.5
Ghana	-3	2	2.7	-0.4
Lesotho	16.2	2.8	-19.5	4.1
Malawi	-15	5.6	15.1	5.0
Namibia	18.6	4.3	20.1	28.4
Nigeria	-16.5	2.1	-24.1	-21.0
South Africa	11.7	2.5	17.9	18.7
Zambia	2.6	-9.6	4	0.7
Zimbabwe	-16	-8.8	-15.8	-22.0

F. Control of Corruption, scale from -2 to 2 (World Bank)

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Botswana	0.53	1.02	0.8	0.86
Ghana	-0.44	-0.34	-0.39	-0.17
Lesotho	0.03	0.32	-0.18	-0.05
Malawi	-0.5	-0.21	-0.85	-0.83
Namibia	0.24	1.13	0.16	0.18
Nigeria	-1.01	-1.06	-1.32	-1.11
South Africa	0.42	0.57	0.35	0.48
Uganda	-0.62	-0.86	-0.92	-0.71
Zambia	-0.56	-0.82	-0.91	-0.74
Zimbabwe	-0.13	-0.87	-1.22	-1.01

G. Freedom of the Press*, scale from 1 to 100 (Freedom House)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Botswana	70	70	72	73	70	70	70
Ghana	40	39	39	45	73	70	72
Lesotho	42	41	44	48	54	58	60
Malawi	60	58	48	48	46	43	48
Namibia	70	62	66	66	66	63	66
Nigeria	7	45	47	45	43	47	47
South Africa	72	72	75	77	77	75	76
Uganda	60	60	60	60	58	55	56
Zambia	40	38	38	38	35	37	37
Zimbabwe	39	36	33	31	17	12	11

* Freedom House scores are 100 to 1 with 1 being a completely free press. These scores are reversed so that a score of 100 is a completely free press.

H. Political Rights*, scale from 1 to 7 (Freedom House)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Botswana	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Ghana	4	4	5	5	5	5	5
Lesotho	3	3	3	3	5	5	5
Malawi	5	4	4	3	3	4	3
Namibia	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Nigeria	1	3	3	3	3	3	3
South Africa	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Uganda	3	2	1	1	1	2	2
Zambia	2	2	2	2	3	3	3
Zimbabwe	2	1	1	1	1	1	0

* Freedom House scores are 7 to 1 with 1 being maximum political rights. These scores are reversed so that a score of 7 is the highest degree of political rights.

I. Civil Liberties*, scale from 1 to 7 (Freedom House)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Botswana	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Ghana	4	4	4	4	4	5	5
Lesotho	3	3	3	3	4	4	4
Malawi	4	4	4	4	3	3	3
Namibia	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Nigeria	3	4	3	2	2	3	3
South Africa	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Uganda	3	2	2	2	3	3	3
Zambia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Zimbabwe	2	2	2	1	1	1	1

* Freedom House scores are 7 to 1 with 1 being maximum civil liberties. These scores are reversed so that a score of 7 is the highest degree of civil liberties.

J. Ratio of Votes to Registered Voters by percentage (IFES)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	†
Botswana		77.1					76.2			Parl
Ghana			60				85			Pres
Lesotho	71.8				66.7					Parl
Malawi		93.8					47.6			Pres
Namibia		62.8					84.9			Pres
Nigeria		52.2				69				Pres
South Africa		89.3					76.7			Parl
Uganda				70.3					69.2	Pres
Zambia				67.8					70.1	Pres
Zimbabwe			48.3					47.7		Parl

†Presidential elections were used where available; Parliamentary elections were used in the absence of presidential elections.

K. Political Competition, scale from 1 to 10 (*Polity IV*)

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Botswana	9	9	9	9
Ghana	8	8	8	9
Lesotho	NA	NA	7	7
Malawi	9	9	8	8
Namibia	9	9	9	9
Nigeria	NA	5	5	5
South Africa	9	9	9	9
Uganda	2	2	2	2
Zambia	7	7	7	7
Zimbabwe	2	3	2	2

L. Voice and Accountability, scale from -2 to 2 (World Bank)

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Botswana	0.77	0.78	0.73	0.73
Ghana	-0.53	0	0.01	0.39
Lesotho	-0.01	-0.03	-0.16	0.28
Malawi	-0.1	-0.28	-0.56	-0.5
Namibia	0.42	0.28	0.33	0.47
Nigeria	-1.48	-0.68	-0.7	-0.65
South Africa	0.87	1.05	0.73	0.86
Uganda	-0.61	-0.94	-0.77	-0.64
Zambia	-0.11	-0.24	-0.4	-0.36
Zimbabwe	-0.73	-0.97	-1.51	-1.48

M. Executive Recruitment, scale from 1 to 8 (*Polity IV*)

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Botswana	8	8	8	8
Ghana	5	5	7	8
Lesotho	NA	NA	8	8
Malawi	7	7	7	7
Namibia	7	7	7	7
Nigeria	NA	7	7	7
South Africa	8	8	8	8
Uganda	5	5	5	5
Zambia	3	3	7	7
Zimbabwe	3	3	3	3

N. Executive Constraints, scale from 1 to 7 (*Polity IV*)

	1998	2000	2002	2004
Botswana	7	7	7	7
Ghana	4	4	6	6
Lesotho	NA	NA	7	7
Malawi	5	5	4	6
Namibia	5	5	5	5
Nigeria	NA	5	5	5
South Africa	7	7	7	7
Uganda	3	3	3	3
Zambia	5	5	5	5
Zimbabwe	3	3	2	2

O. Dispersed Power Index, scale from -2 to 2

	1998	2004
Botswana	1.15567	1.04129
Ghana	-0.45397	0.81855
Lesotho	NA	0.48292
Malawi	0.38296	-0.36154
Namibia	0.53859	0.60356
Nigeria	NA	-0.47319
South Africa	1.34451	1.11432
Uganda	-0.8113	-0.83635
Zambia	-0.73872	-0.32949
Zimbabwe	-1.41774	-2.06006

P. Gross National Income per capita, PPP, current international dollars (World Bank)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Botswana	6,270	6,610	7,190	7,700	8,190	8,900	9,590
Ghana	1,710	1,770	1,840	1,920	1,990	2,090	2,220
Lesotho	2,580	2,590	2,660	2,800	2,940	3,090	3,270
Malawi	560	570	570	550	560	590	630
Namibia	5,790	5,910	6,120	6,300	6,720	6,990	7,520
Nigeria	760	760	790	820	820	910	970
South Africa	8,800	8,920	9,260	9,570	9,970	10,340	11,160
Uganda	1,100	1,170	1,220	1,270	1,330	1,360	1,430
Zambia	700	710	740	780	800	840	900
Zimbabwe	2,680	2,590	2,410	2,390	2,300	2,090	2,040

R. Correlations of Basic Needs Satisfaction and Democracy, using Pearson's 'r'

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Changes in Basic Needs Satisfaction</i>					
<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Initial Democracy</i>		<i>Changes in Democracy</i>			
<i>Controls</i>		<i>wealth</i>		<i>wealth</i>	<i>dem</i>	<i>wealth, dem</i>
	1a	1b	2a	2b	2c	2d
Control of Corruption	0.47	-0.54	0.34	0.27	0.25	0.21
Freedom of Press	0.69	0.49	-0.1	0.29	0.43	0.46
Freedoms	0.67	0.48	0.07	0.28	0.23	0.23
Political Rights	0.71	0.53	0	0.29	0.39	0.39
Civil Liberties	0.53	0.36	0.22	0.24	0.15	0.17
Participation	0.52	0.34	-0.07	0.03	0.6	0.5
Political Competition	0.71	0.66	-0.09	-0.15	-0.02	-0.06
Voice and Accountability	0.69	0.41	-0.01	0.32	0.31	0.33
Executive Recruitment	0.54	0.38	-0.11	0.17	0.33	0.36
Executive Constraints	0.41	0.18	0.21	0.42	0.25	0.39
Dispersed Power Index	0.58	0.45	0.13	0.22	0.27	0.27
<i>'Third' Variable</i>						
PPP GNI per capita	0.5		0.42			0.65

S. Correlations of BNS and Democracy in Low Wealth Countries, using Pearson's 'r'

<i>Hypothesis</i>	1a	2a
Control of Corruption	0.3	0.5
Freedom of Press	0.7	0.02
Pol and Civ Freedom	0.76	0.37
Participation	0.81	-0.42
Political Competition	0.99	-0.18
Voice and Accountability	0.86	0.03
Executive Recruitment	0.64	0.41
Executive Constraints	0.92	0.74
Dispersed Power Index	0.87	0.33
<i>'Third' Variable</i>		
PPP GNI per capita	-0.19	0.65

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- ⁷ Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
- ⁸ Lipset. 1959. *Political Man*. p. 50.
- ⁹ Walt W. Rostow, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Historical References, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Biographies+and+Profiles/Profiles/Walt+W.+Rostow.htm>. Rostow's model of economic modernization argues for five stages of development: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and high mass consumption.
- ¹⁰ The only exceptions have been Argentina in 1976 with a GDP per capita of US\$7000, Malaysia in 1995 with a GDP per capita of US\$4300, and Croatia in 1995 with a GDP per capita of US\$4050. (Halperin *et al.* *The Democracy Advantage*, p. 75.)
- ¹¹ Przeworski, *et al.* 2000. *Democracy and Development*, Conclusions p. 273-274.
- ¹² Inglehart *et al.* 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, p. 3.
- ¹³ Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*, p. 152-154
- ¹⁴ Halperin *et al.* 2005. *The Democracy Advantage*, p. 35-36.
- ¹⁵ From *Polity IV* and Freedom House, respectively.
- ¹⁶ Halperin *et al.* 2005. *The Democracy Advantage*, p. 35.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
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- ²⁰ Mattes *ibid.*
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- ²² Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino. "An Overview," in *The Quality of Democracy*, Special Edition, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (October 2004), p. 21.
- ²³ Only considering *democracies* would be problematic because it would depend on the operational definition of democracy. For example, by Przeworski and Huntington's requirements of peaceful turnover of power, once and twice respectively, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa would not be considered democracies.
- ²⁴ Elkins, Zachary, "Gradations of Democracy," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44 (April 2000), p. 299.
- ²⁵ Rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, respect for civil and political freedoms, political equality, and responsiveness; Diamond and Morlino, in "An Overview," (October 2004), p. 21.
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- ²⁷ Diamond and Morlino refer to these dimensions as 'qualities', but this term creates more confusion in this context. 'Dimensions' more appropriately capture each concept's role within democracy. Diamond and Morlino, in "An Overview," p. 21.
- ²⁸ Beetham, David, "Freedom as the Foundation," in *The Quality of Democracy*, Special Edition, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (October 2004). p. 63.
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- ³⁰ Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3630 (June 2005). Appendix D.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ 'Control of Corruption' was chosen to represent rule of law for two reasons. First, corruption presents a significant problem to many countries in Africa. Second, controlling corruption most closely addresses the extent of dispersed power with rule of law. Researchers will need to change their focus when corruption becomes less of a problem and if they are not studying dispersed power.

³⁵ Freedom of association, thought, expression, assembly etc.

³⁶ Access to public office, elections etc.

³⁷ Beetham, "Freedom as the Foundation," (October 2004), p. 64.

³⁸ Socioeconomic inequality strongly relates to measures of poverty used in the dependent variable, thus creating confusion in causal relation. An analysis of the complex relationship between civil, political, economic and social rights and equality is much more complicated and interrelated than the confines of this analysis allows. There are some implications of the relationship between aspects of equality that are worth mentioning. Even if direct corruption is under control, as measured in part (1), people can use their economic and social resources to influence almost every stage of policy development and implementation. Influences include coercive power, state administrative apparatus, economic class, capital ownership, social status unequal influence on the production and diffusion of culture, politically relevant knowledge etc. Policies regulating the conversion of economic inequalities into political advantages are substantively different than those policies that directly address economic inequalities. Although some regulation is necessary, attempting to comprehensively control conversions from economic to political advantage is not possible and likely undesirable. Extensive government market regulation may potentially violate other freedoms and may negatively affect the market. (Rueschemeyer, "Addressing Inequality," (October 2004), pp. 82-85).

³⁹ Data will be from Freedom in the World Country Rankings, Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org and Press Freedom 1994 to 2004, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

⁴⁰ One political science classic stressing the importance of civic society is Putnam, Robert. 1992. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.

⁴¹ The comparability between countries is somewhat questionable since the elections were of a different nature. Presidential election data was used when available; parliamentary election data was used when there was no presidential election.

⁴² IFES Election Guide, <http://www.electionguide.org/>

⁴³ Marshall, G. Monty and Keith Jagers, 2002. *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002, Dataset Users' Manual*, University of Maryland, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity>, p. 24.

⁴⁴ *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004, Polity IV Project*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp>.

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⁴⁶ Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁴⁷ Ibid, Appendix D1.

⁴⁸ *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004, Polity IV Project*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp>.

⁴⁹ *Polity IV Project, Dataset Users' Manual*, p. 23.

⁵⁰ *Polity IV Project, Dataset Users' Manual*, p. 19.

⁵¹ Afrobarometer Survey Data, <http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/surveys.html>.

⁵² Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁵³ Freedom in the World Country Rankings, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

⁵⁴ Freedom in the World Country Rankings, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

⁵⁵ Press Freedom 1994 to 2004, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

⁵⁶ IFES is no longer an acronym; it is now the name of the organization

⁵⁷ IFES Election Guide, <http://www.electionguide.org/>

⁵⁸ *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004, Polity IV Project*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp>.

⁵⁹ Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁶⁰ *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004, Polity IV Project*, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp>.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars." (World Bank, International Comparison Program database.)

⁶³ Afrobarometer, "Survey Countries," <http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries.html>.

⁶⁴ First round data for Uganda is not available, thus mean scores include nine countries.

⁶⁵ See Appendix A for complete figures. Afrobarometer survey data.

⁶⁶ Mattes, Robert *et al.* *Survival and Democracy in Southern Africa*, Afrobarometer (2003).

⁶⁷ "What does Cronbach's Alpha mean?" <http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/SPSS/faq/alpha.html>

⁶⁸ This index is generated by SPSS as values between -2.0 and +2.0. For simplicity and comparability, the values are converted into percentages using the formula $[(x+2)/4]*100$.

⁶⁹ Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁷⁰ Press Freedom 1994 to 2004, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

⁷¹ Freedom in the World Country Rankings, Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.

⁷² IFES Election Guide, <http://www.electionguide.org/>

⁷³ Change in Botswana, Zambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe was not visually depicted because they fluctuated less than five percent.

⁷⁴ *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004*, *Polity IV Project*.

⁷⁵ Initial data was unavailable for Lesotho and Nigeria.

⁷⁶ Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁷⁷ *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004*, *Polity IV Project*.

⁷⁸ Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁷⁹ South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Uganda experienced minimal changes of less than 0.05. Thus they were not included on the increases and decreases graphs.

⁸⁰ This excludes Nigeria and Lesotho since initial data is not available. *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004*, *Polity IV Project*.

⁸¹ *Polity IV Project*, Dataset Users' Manual, p. 23.

⁸² This excludes Nigeria and Lesotho since initial data is not available. *Polity IV Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004*, *Polity IV Project*.

⁸³ *Polity IV Project*, Dataset Users' Manual and Kaufmann *et al.* "Governance Matters IV," June 2005.

⁸⁴ Schmitter, Philippe C., "The Limits of Horizontal Accountability," in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner, eds., 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, p. 59-63. "Servants of the state will be often be tempted to collude and protect their shared privileges...the architects of the U.S. constitutional order saw checks and balances as 'auxiliary precautions' meant precisely to place limits on potentially unjust or unwise majority desires." Referenced in Schmitter, Philippe C., "The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability," in *The Quality of Democracy*, Special Edition, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (October 2004), p. 53.

⁸⁵ This uses Cronbach's Alpha, which measures how well variables can be combined into "a single uni-dimensional latent construct." The closer to the numerical value of one the value is the more uni-dimensional the construct, the closer to zero the more multidimensional.

"What does Cronbach's Alpha mean?" <http://www.ats.ucla.edu/STAT/SPSS/faq/alpha.html>.

⁸⁶ These initial figures do not include Lesotho and Nigeria due to gaps in *Polity IV* data.

⁸⁷ Initial data for Lesotho and Nigeria is incomplete due to gaps in *Polity IV* data.

⁸⁸ World Bank, International Comparison Program database.

⁸⁹ "Quick Reference Tables," The World Bank 2007,

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20399244~menuPK:1504474~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>.

⁹⁰ Country classifications of low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high incomes use the Atlas method of calculating GNI per capita, which the World Bank uses for comparing relative sizes of economies. This analysis uses GNI per capita using purchasing power parity (PPP), which the World Bank uses for measurement of poverty and well-being. The Atlas method converts local currency to international dollars using a three-year average of exchange rates. The PPP method substitutes global prices for locally measured prices.

"Country Classifications," The World Bank. 2007.

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>.

⁹¹ Because initial data for Uganda was not available for basic needs satisfaction, it is not included in the following analysis.

⁹² "Country Classifications," The World Bank. 2007.

⁹³ Halperin *et al.* *The Democracy Advantage*, p. 75.

⁹⁴ This analysis uses PPP GNI per capita, which is different than GDP, but similar enough to use 4000 as a general guideline. GNI = (GDP + Net Receipts of Primary Income). "Quick Reference Tables," The World Bank, 2007.

⁹⁵ Uganda and Zambia decreased by 0.26

⁹⁶ Zimbabwe achieved independence 18 April, 1980. "Timeline: Zimbabwe," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1831470.stm.

⁹⁷ "Shock Defeat for Mugabe," BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/641817.stm>.

⁹⁸ "Law targets white farm confiscation in Zimbabwe," April 7, 2000,

<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/04/07/zimbabwe.land/>

⁹⁹ Malawi dropped by 12 points over the same period.

¹⁰⁰ These are determined using the equation (7 - freedom house scores).

¹⁰¹ Initial 'Political Competition' data was not available for Nigeria and Lesotho, thus they are not included.

¹⁰² *Polity IV* Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004, *Polity IV* Project,

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp>.

¹⁰³ Such other measures of competition may consider the historical record of turnover of power. For instance, the same parties have ruled Botswana and South Africa since their respective independence.

¹⁰⁴ Zambia decreased by 0.25. (World Bank, *Governance Matters IV*.)

¹⁰⁵ Initial 'Executive Recruitment' data was not available for Nigeria and Lesotho, thus they are not included.

¹⁰⁶ The 1996 Constitutional Amendment "imposed new requirements on persons seeking to hold the office of president. These included that the person be a Zambian citizen born to parents who are Zambian by birth or descent and that the person not be a tribal chief."

"Zambia: Human Rights Developments," Human Rights Watch World Report 1997,

<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/AFRICA-10.htm>

¹⁰⁷ "Zambia," Africa 2001, Committee to Protect Journalists, <http://www.cpj.org/attacks01/africa01/zambia.html>

¹⁰⁸ IFES Election Guide, www.electionguide.org

¹⁰⁹ *Polity IV* Annual Time-Series Dataset 2004, *Polity IV* Project,

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp>

¹¹⁰ Initial 'Executive Constraints' data was not available for Nigeria and Lesotho, thus they are not included.

¹¹¹ Cronbach's Alpha for Dispersed Power: initial (0.69), final (0.71); Basic Needs Satisfaction: initial (0.81), final (0.94)

¹¹² Afrobarometer does not include initial data for Uganda; *Polity IV* does not include initial data Lesotho and Nigeria; consequently these countries are omitted in the correlation of dispersed power and basic needs satisfaction.

¹¹³ Diamond and Morlino refer to these dimensions as 'qualities', but this term creates more confusion in this context. 'Dimensions' more appropriately capture each concepts' role within democracy. Diamond and Morlino, in "An Overview," p. 21.

¹¹⁴ Unique political, economic, social and natural circumstances may account for some of the variation or lack of variation exhibited by given countries. While this analysis briefly addressed some extenuating circumstances, limited space does not permit a comprehensive analysis or narrative of each country.

¹¹⁵ <http://www.latinobarometro.org/>

¹¹⁶ <http://www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/nebo.shtml>

¹¹⁷ <http://eacsurvey.law.ntu.edu.tw/>

¹¹⁸ *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, pp. 238-276. Edited by Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

¹¹⁹ For ideas on how to measure participation or 'civicness' see Putnam, Robert. 1992. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.

¹²⁰ Halperin *et al.* *The Democracy Advantage*, p. 1.

¹²¹ Halperin *et al.* use the *Polity IV* scale of democracy from 0 to 10.

¹²² Halperin *et al.* operationalize social welfare as life expectancy, secondary school enrollment, infant mortality etc.

¹²³ The theoretical and policy implications that mirror Halperin et al.'s conclusion are cited as such; conclusions without references do not derive specifically from Halperin et al.'s work but rather from my broader exposure and experience.

¹²⁴ Halperin *et al.* *The Democracy Advantage*, p. 232.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 233.

¹²⁶ Donors could use multiple methods to determine whether a country is democratic or is becoming more democratic. Halperin uses the *Polity IV* scale and this analysis uses an index derived from multiple indicators.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 237.

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